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Abstract 
The writer of this thesis studied the governments of Israel and the United 
States of America.  They share a common means of choosing their political 
leaders.  They are both democracies, in the sense that they hold elections to 
determine who will serve as a political leader (law makers and enforcers). This 
thesis compares and contrasts the method of choosing judges in Israel to that of 
Illinois, which is one of 50 states that make up the United States of America. 
Israel appoints their judges and Illinois elects their judges.  Both approaches of 
determining who will serve as a judge have negative attributes.  Israel’s approach 
suffers from members of the appointment committee favoring candidates who 
share their political views.  Illinois’ approach suffers from the need to raise large 
amounts of money to finance judicial campaigns, which can lead to undue 
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 This is a thesis written as part of the scholastic requirements for a 
Master’s Degree in Judicial Studies. 
 I developed the idea for this Thesis while I was studying with judges from 
Israel.  I was immensely impressed with their passion for justice and wanted to 
know more about them.  During discussions, I learned that they were appointed 
to serve as judges.  I come from a State (Illinois) that elects their judges.  Illinois 
has a long history of corruption and favoritism amongst our otherwise admirable 
judges.  I began to wonder if we could prevent the corrupt judges from ever 
taking the bench if we used a system of appointments.     
 The debate over how best to select judges is hardly novel.  Most would 
agree that the solution has yet to be found. As long as the issue has yet to be 
resolved, scholars have a continuing responsibility to address it. The answer to 
the complex question will not be found in this Master’s Thesis.  What I hope to do 
in this Thesis, is to give general information about a sample government (Israel) 
where judges are appointed and a sample government (USA) where judges are 
elected.   
 It may seem peculiar to compare a country with a population of 8 million 
with a country of over 300 million.  The comparison is fair in that both are 
democracies and hold themselves out as model governments that recognize 
human rights.  I also felt most comfortable discussing Israel’s courts because I 
spent six week over two years studying with Israeli judges and under Israeli 





Supreme Court.  I felt I had a better understanding of Israel’s courts than any of 
the Unites States Courts that use the appointment system.  I also wanted to give 
the reader of similar discussions some fresh information that they were not likely 
to receive otherwise.  
 I will start by offering some background information on how each 
government came into existence.  The reader will find that Israel came into 
existence through a UN mandate and the United States come into existence 
through a revolution.1  I will then describe how each is governed.  The reader will 
find that while the titles of the office holders differ in each government, 
democracy is prevalent throughout both. I will then move on to the role of the 
judges in each government.  I will rely on Israeli judges and scholars to describe 
what is expected of Israeli judges and on and USA judges and scholars to 
describe what is expected of USA judges.  The reader will find that what is 
expected in Israel and the USA is very similar; this reinforced my initial 
impression that I chose the correct governments to analyses in this thesis.   This 
thesis will offer general facts about judges in both Israel and the United States.  
The reader will come away with basic knowledge of the qualifications and 
environment of the judges. 
 I will then review the two very different models of becoming judges.  I will 
describe how Israel appoints judges and how judges are elected in the USA.  
                                                           
1 A fascinating debate would be which has greater integrity.  The distinction is 
between one’s peers recognizing your right to exist as a government, Israel, 
verses a self-recognition that the Creator has given you the right to from a 






The reader will find that both systems look perfectly acceptable, as a means to 
ensure a just judiciary on paper.  This thesis will include a critical examination of 
both approaches.  The reader will find that in practice, both systems have major 
flaws.  



















ESTABLISHMENT OF ISRAEL 
 In this section I will summarize the history of the land called Israel as it 
relates to Jewish people.  The reader will find that the Jews have staked a claim 
for the land comprising Israel since round 1250 B.C. 
Jewish people2 trace their origin to Abraham, who established the belief 
that there is only one God, the creator of the universe. Abraham, his son Yitshak 
(Isaac), and grandson Jacob (Israel), are referred to as the patriarchs of the 
Jewish People (Israelites). All three patriarchs lived in the Land of Canaan, that 
later came to be known as the Land of Israel.3 They and their wives are buried in 
the Ma'arat HaMachpela, the Tomb of the Patriarchs, in Hebron.4 
 The rule of the Jewish people in Israel starts with the conquests of Joshua 
(ca. 1250 BC). The most noteworthy kings were King David (1010-970 BC), who 
made Jerusalem the Capital of Israel, and his son Solomon (Shlomo, 970-931 
BC), who built the first Temple in Jerusalem as prescribed in the Tanach.5 
 In 587 BC, Babylonian Nebuchadnezzar's army captured Jerusalem, 
destroyed the Temple, and exiled the Jews to Babylon (modern day Iraq).  The 
year 587 BC marks a turning point in the history of the region. From this year 
                                                           
2 Originally, the Hebrew term Jews [Yehudi] referred only to members of the tribe 
of Judah. Later, after the destruction of the northern kingdom of Israel, the term 
Jews was applied for the tribes of Judah, Benjamin and Levi, as well as 
scattered settlements from other tribes. (“Who Is a Jew?” Judaism101. 
Retrieved 8 February 2014) 
3 The term Jews in its original meaning refers to the people of the tribe of Judah 
or the people of the kingdom of Judah. The name of both the tribe and kingdom 
derive from Judah, the fourth son of Jacob. "Jew", Oxford English Dictionary.   
4 Genesis, Chapter 23 





onwards, the region was ruled or controlled by a succession of superpower 
empires of the time in the following order: Babylonian, Persian, Greek Hellenistic, 
Roman and Byzantine Empires, Islamic and Christian crusaders, Ottoman 
Empire, and the British Empire.6 The area had been governed by Great Britain 
since 1922. Since that time, Jewish immigration to the region had increased, and 
tensions between Arabs and Jews had grown.  
 In 1917, The Balfour Declaration was introduced by the British 
government.  It enshrined in a League of Nations mandate in 1920, that a 
"national home for the Jewish people" would be founded in Palestine, while 
preserving the "civil and religious" rights of non-Jewish communities there. The 
British were unsuccessful because they could not reconcile the conflicting 
principles.7 
        The Holocaust of European Jewry in the Second World War8 reinforced the 
Jews determination for a Jewish State. Their quest was realized on 29 November 
1947, when, exhausted by World War II and increasingly intent upon withdrawing 
from the Middle East region, Britain referred the issue of Palestine to the UN. The 
United Nations General Assembly voted on United Nations Resolution 181.9 
                                                           
6 Israel Science and Technology Directory 1999-2015. 
7 BBC, 6 May 2008 
8 The Holocaust was the systematic, bureaucratic, state-sponsored persecution 
and murder of six million Jews by the Nazi regime and its collaborators. 
"Holocaust" is a word of Greek origin meaning "sacrifice by fire.” United States 
Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington, D.C. Encyclopedia Last Updated 
June 20, 2014. 





The resolution passed by the United Nations General Assembly called for 
the partition of Palestine into Arab and Jewish states, with the city of Jerusalem
as a corpus separatum (Latin: “separate entity”) to be governed by a special 
international regime. The fate of the proposal was initially uncertain, but after a 
period of intense lobbying by pro-Jewish groups and individuals, the resolution 
was “passed with 33 votes in favor, 13 against, and 10 abstentions”.10 The 
Palestinian and other Arabs challenged the United Nations’ legal competence to 
partition Palestine. Moreover, they argued that Palestine was to be included in 
the Arab territories that had been promised independence through an agreement 
with Britain in 1915 in exchange for Arab support in confronting the allied 
Ottomans and Germans during World War I in the Arab region11. Nonetheless, 
an Israeli state was declared in 1948 and the Israelis subsequently 
defeated the Arabs in a series of wars without ending the deep 
tensions between the two sides12. In October 2011, Mahmoud Abbas, 
President of the Palestinian Authority since 15 January 2005, stated that “the 








                                                           
10 Ibid. 
11 “What is the Origin of the Palestinian/Israeli Conflict” Trans Arab Research 
Institute, by Elaine Hagopian. 
12 Central Intelligent Agency The World Fact Book. 





The following is part of the text of the crucial UN resolution regarding the 
partition of Palestine14: 
 
Resolution 181 (II). Future government of Palestine 
PLAN OF PARTITION WITH ECONOMIC UNION 
Future constitution and government of Palestine 
 
 
A. TERMINATION OF MANDATE, PARTITION AND 
INDEPENDENCE 
1. The Mandate for Palestine shall terminate as soon as possible 
but in any case not later than 1 August 1948. 
 
2. The armed forces of the mandatory Power shall be progressively 
withdrawn from Palestine, the withdrawal to be completed as soon 
as possible but in any case not later than 1 August 1948. 
 
 The mandatory Power shall advise the Commission, as far in 
advance as possible, of its intention to terminate the Mandate and 
to evacuate each area. 
 
 The mandatory Power shall use its best endeavors to ensure 
than an area situated in the territory of the Jewish State, including a 
seaport and hinterland adequate to provide facilities for a 
substantial immigration, shall be evacuated at the earliest possible 
date and in any event not later than 1 February 1948. 
 
3. Independent Arab and Jewish States and the Special 
International Regime for the City of Jerusalem, set forth in part III of 
this plan, shall come into existence in Palestine two months after 
the evacuation of the armed forces of the mandatory Power has 
been completed but in any case not later than 1 October 1948. The 
boundaries of the Arab State, the Jewish State, and the City of 
Jerusalem shall be as described in parts II and III below. 
 
4. The period between the adoption by the General Assembly of its 
recommendation on the question of Palestine and the 
establishment of the independence of the Arab and Jewish States 
shall be a transitional period. 
 
 
                                                           







ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
           In this section I will discuss the establishment of the USA.  The reader will 
find that the inhabitants recognized a right to self-determination and declared 
themselves an independent nation.    
 The first Europeans to arrive in North America -- at least the first for whom 
there is solid evidence -- were Norse, traveled west from Greenland, where Erik 
the Red had founded a settlement around the year 985. In 1001 his son Leif is 
thought to have explored the northeast coast of what is now Canada and spent at 
least one winter there15. The Norsemen were followed by French, Spanish, 
Dutch, and British explorers. The British were the most successful at establishing 
colonies, from both a financial and a cultural perspective. 
 North American colonists found themselves progressively at odds with 
British imperial policies regarding taxation and frontier policy in the 1760s and 
early 1770s. After repeated protests failed to sway British policies, and instead 
resulted in the closing of the port of Boston and the declaration of martial law in 
Massachusetts, the colonial governments sent delegates to a Continental 
Congress to coordinate a colonial boycott of British goods. Hostility broke out 
between American colonists and British forces in Massachusetts. The 
Continental Congress worked with local groups, originally intended to enforce the 
                                                           





boycott, to coordinate resistance against the British. The British officials 
throughout the colonies found their authority challenged by informal local 
governments, although loyalist sentiment remained strong in some areas. 
 Colonial leaders nevertheless hoped to reconcile with the British 
Government, and all but the most radical members of Congress were unwilling to 
declare independence. “However, in late 1775, Benjamin Franklin, then a 
member of the Secret Committee of Correspondence, hinted to French agents 
and other European sympathizers that the colonies were increasingly leaning 
towards seeking independence.”16 While perhaps true, Franklin also hoped to 
convince the French to supply the colonists with aid. The French officials would 
only consider the possibility of an alliance after the colonists achieved 
Independence. 
      During the winter of 1775–1776, reconciliation with Britain seemed unlikely.  
The members of Continental Congress increasingly viewed independence as the 
only course of action available to them.  The disenchantment grew after the 
British Parliament prohibited trade with the colonies on December 22, 1775. In 
January 1776, the publication of Thomas Paine’s pamphlet “Common Sense”17
was widely distributed.  It encouraged the colonies’ independence. By February 
of 1776, colonial leaders were discussing the possibility of forming foreign 
alliances and began to draft the Model Treaty that would serve as a basis for the 
                                                           
16 U.S. Department of State January 2009. 
17 Full title – Common Sense; Addressed to the Inhabitants of America, on the 






1778 alliance with France. In April of 1776, the Continental Congress responded 
to the British Parliament by prohibiting trade with the colonies by opening colonial 
ports. Leaders for the cause of independence wanted to make certain that they
had sufficient congressional support before they would bring the issue to the 
vote. On June 7, 1776, Richard Henry Lee introduced a motion in Congress to 
declare independence. Other members of Congress were amenable but thought 
some colonies not quite ready. However, Congress did form a committee to draft 
a declaration of independence and assigned this duty to Thomas Jefferson18. 
 The Declaration of Independence set forth the ideas and principles behind 
a just and fair government, and the Constitution outlined how this government 
would function.  It officially broke all political ties between the American colonies 
and Great Britain.19 
 The Declaration assertion that rights are innate, rather than created20.  
Professor Charles L. Black, Jr. states that the Declaration of Independence 
                                                           
18 Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, United States Department of 
State. 
19 US Citizen and Immigration Service M654 (rev. 07/08) 
20 There is some debate over the meaning of creator. “The most famous religious 
phrase in the Declaration—that people are "endowed by their Creator with 
certain inalienable rights"—was not included in Jefferson's original draft. He 
had written that people derive inherent rights from their "equal Creation." The 
iconic language was added by a small committee, including Benjamin Franklin 
and John Adams.  "Creator" was a theologically ambiguous word. Most Deists 
used it, but it was also commonly spoken by the most orthodox religions of the 
day. Timothy Dwight, a Congregational minister who served as president of 
Yale College from 1795-1817, delivered a sermon stating that the Bible 
contained "as full a proof, that Christ is the Creator, Wall Street Journal the 
Creator is God."  Was the Declaration of Independence Christian? By Michael I. 





recognizes a safeguard of human rights, the Declaration of Independence 
“commits all the governments in our country to ‘securing’ for . . . people certain 
human rights21”: 
 
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created 
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain 
inalienable Rights that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit 
of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are 
instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent 
of the governed . . . 22 
 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL 
In this section I will describe the structure of the government of Israel.  
Israel is comprised of three branches of government.   The Legislative, Executive 
and Judicial branches act to give governance to the eight million Israelis23.  
According to the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the three branches are 
described below 24.  
Israel is governed by a multi-party parliamentary system. 
Their democratic rule is rooted in the following principles and 
institutions: basic laws which lay down the order of government and 
of the citizens' rights; the holding of elections to the house of 
representatives and to municipal councils every few years, 
following which, a central government and local authorities are set 
up, based on the principle of the rule of the majority, with the rights 
of the minority guaranteed by law; the principle of the separation 
between the legislative branch, the executive branch, and the 
judiciary, to which the institution of state control has been added; 
freedom of the press. 
THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH: THE GOVERNMENT 
Until 1992, it was the President who assigned the task of 
forming a new Government to the head of the list with the best 
                                                           
21  698 Cornell Law Review [Vol. 97:693]. 
22 U.S. Declaration of Independence, (1776). 
23 World Population Review 2014 





chances of succeeding, who was also usually the head of the 
largest party in the Knesset. The Government required the approval 
of the Knesset, so that it needed to represent a coalition supported 
by a majority of the Knesset members, even if not all of its 
supporters were actual members in it.  
In an amendment to the Basic Law, the Government 
adopted in 1992 established a system of direct election of prime 
minister, which was in effect for three elections: May 1996, May 
1999, and the special election of prime minister in February 2001. 
In March 2001 the Knesset voted to revert to the previous electoral 
system, under which voters cast one ballot for a political party to 
represent them in the Knesset.  
Following consultations, the president presents one Knesset 
member with the responsibility of forming a government. To do so, 
the Knesset member has to present, within 28 days of being given 
the responsibility for forming a government, a list of ministers for 
Knesset approval, together with an outline of proposed government 
guidelines.  
Most of the ministers are responsible for one or more 
Government Ministries, but can also serve as a Minister without 
Portfolio. Ministers do not have to be Knesset members, while 
Deputy Ministers - and there can be more than one Deputy Minister 
in each Ministry - must be members. The addition of new Ministers 
to the Government in the course of its term of office, or a change in 
the distribution of functions among them, requires the Knesset's 
approval.  
It is the Government which determines its own working 
arrangements and the manner in which it adopts decisions. It 
usually meets for one weekly meeting on Sundays, though in 
urgent cases additional meetings may be called. The Government 
may also act by means of standing or occasional Ministerial 
Committees, some of whose decisions require the approval of the 
Government as a whole.  
A Government which has resigned or has been brought 
down by a vote of no-confidence, continues to serve until a new 
Government is formed, and is then called a transitional 
Government.  
The number of Ministries maintained by the Government 
varies from time to time according to the needs and to coalition 
constraints.   
THE PRESIDENCY 
The President of the State is elected by the Knesset in a 
secret vote, and primarily fulfills ceremonial functions as Head of 
State. Candidates for the presidency are customarily proposed by 





President is appointed for one term of seven years.  
The functions of the President are defined in the Basic Law: 
he is President of the State. The President assigns the task of 
forming a new Government to a member of Knesset. In addition, 
the President assumes public functions and activities in accordance 
with the customs which have crystallized on the issue, and with his 
personal inclinations. Among the President's formal functions are 
signing laws (even though he has no control over their content) 
opening the first meeting of the first session of a new Knesset, 
receiving the credentials of new ambassadors of foreign states, 
approving the appointment of civil and religious judges, the State 
Comptroller and the Governor of the Bank of Israel, pardoning 
prisoners or commuting their sentences, etc.  
The legislative authority, the Knesset, Israel's Parliament, 
includes 120 members.  They are elected by popular vote and 
assigned seats for members on a proportional basis. Members 
serve four-year terms. 
The Powers and functions of the Knesset are described by 
The State of Israel. The Knesset is the House of Representatives 
(the parliament) of the State of Israel, in which the full range of 
current opinions are represented. Nevertheless, parties that reject 
the existence of the State of Israel as the state of the Jewish 
People, its democratic nature, or that incite racism may not 
participate in the elections.  
Within the framework of the Israeli democratic system, the 
Knesset is the legislative branch, with the exclusive authority to 
enact laws. The Knesset may pass laws on any subject and in any 
matter, as long as a proposed law does not contradict an existing 
basic law, and the legislative process is carried out as required by 
the law. 
As heir to the authority of the Constituent Assembly, the 
Knesset has a constituent-constitutional role, even though this role 
was denied by some in the past. According to the Proclamation of 
Independence, the constitution of the State of Israel should have 
been prepared by October 1, 1948, but even today Israel does not 
yet have a complete written constitution. Once all the basic laws 
are passed, they will together constitute the state's constitution.  
The Knesset supervises the work of the Government through 
its committees and the work of the plenum.  The Knesset has 
several quasi-judicial functions, which include the power to lift the 
immunity of its members, and the power to have the President of 






  The Knesset also has an elective function through which 
several public officials are elected25. 
 
A general description of the functions of the Israeli Judicial system is 
offered by the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs26:   
The courts deal with cases of persons charged with a breach 
of the law. Charges are brought by citizens against other citizens, 
by the state against citizens, and even by citizens against the state. 
The sessions of the courts of law are usually public, unless it 
is decided to hold closed hearings under special circumstances. 
When more than one judge is presiding, and the judges do not 
agree on a verdict, the opinion of the majority is decisive. Israel 
does not have trials by jury.  
The cases brought to the courts are of two types: criminal 
cases and civil cases. A criminal case is one involving a 
transgression of the social order, and its intention is to punish the 
offender if his guilt has been proven. In a civil case the plaintiff is a 
private person or association and the defendant is a private person 
or association. The subject of the trial is the demand that a contract 
signed between the parties be fulfilled, a debt be returned or 
compensation be paid for damages caused. In a civil trial there is 
no punishment, but a duty to pay financial or other compensations.   
The Organization of Courts of Law is managed by The 
Directorate of Courts and is headed by the Director of Courts. The 
system is headed by the President of the Supreme Court of Law 
and the Minister of Justice.  
The organization of the Courts of Law in Israel includes all 
the Courts of Law in Israel:  
1.The Supreme Court 
2.The District Courts of Law 
3.The Magistrates Courts (the first instance) 
4.National Labor Court 
5.Regional Labor Courts 
There are three areas of jurisdiction in the regular courts: 
magistrate courts, which have the authority to try light and 
intermediate offences or civil cases in which the sum claimed is no 
higher than one million shekels (approximately U.S. $300,000); 
district courts, which try serious offenses and civil cases in which 
the sum claimed is over one million shekels; and the Supreme 
Court, which sits in Jerusalem. The number of judges serving on 
                                                           
25 See, The State of Israel, 2010. 





the Supreme Court is determined by the Knesset. The judges elect 
a permanent President of the Supreme Court and a deputy from 
amongst themselves.  
The Supreme Court is divided into two areas of 
responsibility. The first hears appeals for verdicts given by district 
courts. In this capacity it is called the Supreme Court of Appeals. 
The verdict of the Supreme Court of Appeals is final. The second 
hears appeals by persons who feel that they have been wronged by 
one of the State authorities or statutory bodies. In this capacity the 
court is called the High Court of Justice. The High Court of Justice 
functions by means of orders.  
The Organization of Courts of Law is managed by The 
Directorate of Courts and is headed by the Director of Courts. The 
system is headed by the President of the Supreme Court of Law 
and the Minister of Justice.  
In addition, the judicial system also includes the Bailiff Office 
that is, according to the law, linked to the Magistrates Court and the 
Center for Collection of unpaid fees and expenses. The latter is an 
administrative unit within the Directorate of Courts in charge of 
collecting fines and other debts as sentenced by the Courts of Law. 
The Courts of Law are deployed in 50 regions throughout Israel and 
are organized into six districts.  
In addition to the ordinary courts, there are special courts 
which are authorized to deal with specific matters only. The most 
important amongst these are the military courts and the religious 
courts. There are religious courts of the four main religious 
denominations: Jewish, Muslim, Christian, and Druze. Each 
religious court can try cases applying only to members of its own 
religious community who are citizens of the State or permanent 
residents. Since matters of personal status in Israel are usually 
decided on the basis of religious laws, the  
religious courts deal with them. 
 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 
 In this section I will describe the structure of the government of the United 
States.  The reader will find that the United States is comprised of three branches 
of federal government and 50 individual States. Each of the 50 States has its 





federal and state levels.  The three branches are the Legislative, Executive and 
Judicial.  
 On July 4, 2014, the population of the United States was 318,881,992 
people27. The Constitution of the United States divides the federal government 
into three branches to ensure a central government in which no individual or 
group gains too much control.  It nowhere contains an express injunction to 
preserve the boundaries of the three broad powers it grants, nor does it 
expressly enjoin maintenance of a system of checks and balances. Yet, it does 
grant the three separate branches the powers to legislate, to execute, and to 
adjudicate, and it provides throughout the document the means by which each of 
the branches could resist the blandishments and incursions of the others. The 
Framers drew up our basic charter against a background rich in the theorizing of 
scholars and statesmen regarding the proper ordering in a system of government 
of conferring sufficient power to govern while withholding the ability to abridge the 
liberties of the governed28. 
The 3 Branches of Government are: 
 1. Legislative – Makes laws (Congress) 
 2. Executive – Carries out laws (President, Vice President, Cabinet) 
 3. Judicial – Evaluates laws (Supreme Court and Other Courts) 
                                                           
27 U.S. Census Bureau 





 The U.S. government's official web portal, USA.gov29, describes the role 
and powers of each branch: 
 Each branch of government can change acts of the other branches 
as follows: 
The president can veto laws passed by Congress. 
Congress confirms or rejects the president's appointments and can 
remove the president from office in exceptional circumstances. 
The justices of the Supreme Court, who can overturn 
unconstitutional laws, are appointed by the President and 
confirmed by the Senate. 
Legislative Branch 
The legislative branch enacts legislation, confirms or rejects 
presidential appointments, and has the authority to declare war.  
This branch includes Congress (the Senate and House of 
Representatives) and several agencies that provide support 
services to Congress. American citizens have the right to vote for 
senators and representatives through free, confidential ballots. 
Senate - There are two elected senators per state, totaling 
100 senators. A senate term is six years and there is no limit to the 
number of terms an individual can serve. 
House of Representatives - There are 435 elected 
representatives, which are divided among the 50 states in 
proportion to their total population. There are additional non-voting 
delegates who represent the District of Columbia and the territories. 
A representative serves a two-year term, and there's no limit to the 
number of terms an individual can serve. 
Executive Branch 
The executive branch carries out and enforces laws. It 
includes the President, Vice President, the Cabinet, executive 
departments, independent agencies, and other boards, 
commissions, and committees. 
American citizens have the right to vote for the president and 
vice president through free, confidential ballots. 
Key roles of the executive branch include: 
President - The president leads the country. He/she is the 
head of state, leader of the federal government, and commander-
in-chief of the United States Armed Forces. The president serves a 
four-year term and can be elected no more than two times. 
Vice President - The vice president supports the president. If 
the president is unable to serve, the vice president becomes 






president. He/she can serve an unlimited number of four-year 
terms. 
The Cabinet - Cabinet members serve as advisors to the 
president. They include the vice president and the heads of 
executive departments. Cabinet members are nominated by the 




The judicial branch interprets the meaning of laws, applies 
laws to individual cases, and decides if laws violate the 
Constitution. 
The judicial branch is comprised of the Supreme Court and 
other federal courts. 
Supreme Court - The Supreme Court is the highest court in 
the United States. The justices of the Supreme Court are 
nominated by the president and must be approved by the Senate 
(with at least 51 votes). Congress decides the number of justices. 
Currently, there are nine. There is no fixed term for justices. They 
serve until their death, retirement, or removal in exceptional 
circumstances. 
Other Federal Courts - The Constitution grants Congress the 
authority to establish other federal courts. 
 
THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE IN ISRAEL 
In this section I will describe the role of judges in Israel, from the 
perspective of Israeli scholars and judges. The reader will learn that there are 
many types of judges in Israel.  What will be addressed here is the general role 
that they are expected to play as part of government--in other words, what 





Israeli judges are said to work under a “mixed legal system.” “Although it 
inherited The British law, many statutes in important areas of law, mainly private 
law, enacted since the establishment of the state, adopted Civil Law doctrines.30”  
A thorough analysis of Israeli judges was offered by Judge Amnon 
Straschnov.  Judge Straschnov is a judge in the district court of Tel Aviv.  He 
delivered an analysis of the role of Israeli judges at a Luncheon for the Jewish 
Federation of Tulsa on February 10, 1999. 
 Judge Straschnov concentrated on specific points related to Israeli judges. 
They include, judges not having the benefit of a jury system or written 
Constitution, not hearing capital cases31 and the difficulty judges have deciding 
cases involving orthodox and non-orthodox Jews. 
Regarding the lack of a jury system, unlike the judiciary in the United 
States, Israeli judges not only make decisions on legal issues, but perform the 
role as finders of facts as well, “professionally trained judges handle all aspects 
regarding the administration of justice.32” Israeli judges are not only required to 
decide cases but they are required to justify their decisions, “Israeli judges are 
responsible not only for giving the verdict, but also for providing extremely 
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detailed opinions which are fit to proceed to the upper courts. Generally, laymen 
would not take part in a judicial decision in Israel”33. 
Judge Straschnov offered reasons why Israeli judges must decide the 
cases that they hear.  The first reason involves the difficulty of finding an 
unbiased jury. “It is believed impossible to find twelve people who do not know 
each other, or the grandmother of the prosecutor, or the son in-law of one of the 
witnesses. Such familiarity among potential jurors makes the creation of an 
unbiased jury equally impossible”34 .  The other reason involves the difficulty of 
people agreeing in general: “Additionally, and most importantly, one would be 
hard pressed to find twelve Israelis who agree unanimously on a certain fact or 
point, let alone an entire case35. Judge Straschnov believes that a system where 
judges decide cases best serves the Israeli people and Israeli justice: “Therefore, 
this author believes that a system without a jury best serves the Israeli people 
and Israeli justice36. 
Judge Straschnov spoke of the difficulty that Israeli judges have without 
the benefit of a written constitution. He offered that in spite of the fact that Israeli 
judges do not have a written constitution for guidance, litigants nevertheless 
receive justice. He credits the judges, “they (judges) possess the powers to 
adjudicate constitutional or quasi-constitutional rights”37. He also credits the 
strength of the Supreme Court of Israel, “but even without a written constitution, it 










seems to me that the Supreme Court of the State of Israel is a very strong and 
powerful court, which succeeds in maintaining and preserving human rights in 
general, especially in balancing human rights and the needs of security in the 
State of Israel,”38.  Judge Straschnov made the argument that in the end a just 
result trumps all other considerations, “what is more important is not what the 
written constitution says, but how and in which way the Justices of the Supreme 
Court interpret the constitution.” This remark ironically echoes the observation of 
a famous American jurist. When asked once what does the Constitution of the 
United States mean, Chief Justice Charles E. Hughes replied that the U.S. 
Constitution means what the judges say it means39. 
Straschnov believes that Israeli judges would prefer to have a written 
constitution but Israel is unique and that uniqueness makes that very difficult, 
“Israel has many factions of the people, Arabs and other minorities; ultra-
orthodox Jews who do not serve in the army; we have religious Jews and the 
secular Jews, all with different kinds of views and beliefs.” The differences 
between these segments of Israeli society “have prevented and may continue to 
prevent us from having a written constitution”40. 
On the issue of Israeli judges not applying the death penalty, Judge 
Straschnov points out that the laws of Israel, West Bank, and the Gaza Strip all 
permit capital punishment in special circumstances:  “Offenses performed by the 








Nazis and their aides during World War II, crimes against humanity, and high 
treason in times of war are all punishable by death.”41 
Judge Straschnov cited only one person being executed in Israel since its 
establishment. The “Infamous Nazi Adolf Eichmann was sentenced to death and 
executed in 1962 after he was captured and brought from Argentina to Israel. 
Eichmann played an important role in the Nazi regime. He was personally 
responsible for the extermination of millions of Jews in concentration camps, and 
was in charge of the "final solution" of the Jewish people.  Judge Straschnov 
does not see the policy of not invoking the death penalty in Israel as likely to 
change, “despite the constant struggle against terrorist activity, human rights still 
prevails over security”42. 
The complex make up of orthodox and non-orthodox Jews in Israel is a 
challenge judges in Israel are expected to overcome. Judge Straschnov offered 
the following example of the difficulty Israeli judges face when dealing with issues 
of religion: 
The first Prime Minister of Israel, as well as its founding father, David Ben-
Gurion, made compromises with the ultra-orthodox Jews by exempting the 
yeshiva students from serving in the Army. Because of the compromises Israel's 
laws have evolved with strong consideration of the orthodox religious beliefs. The 
initial compromise had permitted the yeshiva students to avoid military service by 
going to study in the Yeshiva. Not surprisingly, this created unrest and 
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dissatisfaction among the secular population. Many petitions opposing such 
policy went before the Supreme Court, but it always decided this issue was a 
"political question," to use the American terminology. The Court encouraged the 
people to lobby the legislature to reform the situation, however, they did not 
succeed and the law was not amended. 
Finally, the issue went to the Supreme Court. The petition noted that the 
exemption of the yeshiva students amounted to about 29,000 people; more than 
a brigade. Additionally, Israeli soldiers complained that their mandatory service of 
three years would be reduced if the yeshiva students were not exempted from 
service. 
The Supreme Court sat as the High Court of Justice, in a special panel of 
eleven justices. The Court finally spoke and upheld the petition finding that the 
yeshiva student exemption was "unconstitutional," unjust and unfair to the entire 
population. The Court further ordered the Israeli parliament, the Knesset, to 
amend the situation within a year. The Knesset must enact a law that 
enumerates and details exactly who may be exempted and its rationale behind 
each exemption. The legislature, according to the Court, had not gone far 
enough to ensure fairness, and the Court as its overseer demanded the 
legislature create equitable laws43. 
Aharon Barak was appointed Justice of the Supreme Court of Israel in 
1978; Justice Barak served as Supreme Court President from 1995 until 2006. 
He studied law at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem where, after completing a 
                                                           





term of service in the Israeli Defense Forces, he received his Doctorate in Law in 
1963. 
In 2006 Justice Barak published through Princeton University press, “The 
Judge in a Democracy”.  In his book he describes the role of a judge who serves 
in a democracy similar to Israel.  He stated that judges must adhere to the 
legislative branch while interpreting laws, “The Judge has an important role in the 
legislative process. The judge interprets statutes.  Statutes cannot be applied 
unless they are interpreted. The judge may give the statute a new meaning, that 
seeks to bridge the gap between life and life’s changing reality without changing 
the statute itself.  The statute remains as it was, but its meaning changes, 
because the court has given it a new meaning that suits new social needs.  The 
court fulfills its role as junior partner in the legislative project.  It realizes the 
judicial role by bridging the gap between law and life”44.  
Justice Barak explained that judges are expected to examine the 
differences between law and life and may have to give new and modern meaning 
to an old statute.  But he stated that this is not always possible. He offered that 
judges can only go so far in filling the gaps, “sometimes the judge lacks the 
power to bridge the gap between the old language of the statute and society’s 
new reality.  In such a case the judge must set aside his work tools.  The judge 
may not act against the law.  He can only hope that the legislature will do its job 
                                                           





and repeal the old statute.  The judge, as a faithful interpreter, cannot achieve 
such a result.”45 
When an Israeli judge faces a statute that became obsolete, that judge is 
not expected to repeal it. Justice Barak asserts, “I personally do not think that it is 
the proper solution to a particular problem.  The right way is not to rely on judges 
to repeal obsolete laws but rather for the legislature to do so.  Indeed, the Israeli 
legislature occasionally collects pieces of old legislation that are no longer 
necessary and repeals them.  That is the right way to proceed”46. 
Judges are expected to distinguish statutes from common law and have 
leeway when addressing common law. According to Justice Barak, “the court 
may not repeal an obsolete statute.  It may, however, repeal a common law 
holding that has become obsolete.  It may change even a non-obsolete 
precedent if it does not suit today’s’ social needs.  Indeed, judges created 
common law.  In doing so, they sought to provide a solution to the social needs 
of their time.  As these needs change, judges must consider whether it is 
appropriate to change the judicial precedent itself, by expanding or restricting the 
existing law or overturning an old precedent.  Sometimes the new social reality 
necessitates creating new law to resolve problems that did not arise at all in the 
past, where the goal of the new case is to bridge the gap between law and the 
new social reality.”47 
 
                                                           







THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE IN THE UNITED STATES  
In this section I will describe what is expected of a judge in the United 
States from the perspective of United States judges and scholars and judges.  
What will be addressed here is the general role that they are expected to play as 
part of government--in other words, what society expects of them. 
Richard A. Posner is a Judge, in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit and a Senior Lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School. He gave 
the keynote address at a symposium sponsored by the Boston University School 
of Law on “The Role of the Judge in the Twenty-First Century” on April 21, 2006.  
 Judge Posner offered that the role of the judge can be broken down into 3 
concepts.  They are formalism, attitudinalism, and pragmatism. Formalism 
expects judges to accept laws on their face and apply laws to facts in each case:  
Formalism is the conventional, one might say the official, 
conception of the judicial role. It was expressed, I assume tongue-
in-cheek, in an especially unconvincing form by that skilled 
advocate John Roberts at his triumphal confirmation hearing. He 
said that the judge, even if he is a Justice of the U.S. Supreme 
Court, is merely an umpire, calling balls and strikes. Roberts was 
updating, for a sports-crazed century, Alexander Hamilton’s view of 
the judge as one who exercises judgment but not will, and 
Blackstone’s view of judges as the oracles of the law.48 
  
Judge Posner does not expect United States judges to rule under the 
formalist conception of judging: “No serious person thinks that the rules that 
judges in our system apply, particularly appellate judges and most particularly the 
                                                           





Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, are given to them the way the rules of 
baseball are given to umpires.49   
Judge Posner described Attitudinalism as the opposite extreme 
Formalism.  Under Attitudinalism a judge is expected to forgo the laws as rules in 
accordance with their personal preference:  
At its crudest, this is the idea that judges and Justices simply 
vote their political preferences, so if you know whether they are 
Democrats or Republicans you can predict their decisions; a more 
refined version substitutes ideology for party affiliation. It is 
unquestionably true that there are liberal and conservative judges 
and Justices and that if you know which camp a particular judge 
belongs to, you know a lot about how he or she is likely to vote.50 
  
Judge Posner‘s third conception of the judicial role is Pragmatic.  The 
pragmatic approach is a middle ground of Formalism and Attitudinalism:  
The judicial imperative is to decide cases with reasonable dispatch, 
as best one can, even in what I am calling the interesting cases – 
the ones in which the conventional materials of judicial decision 
making just won’t do the trick. For the judge, the duty to decide the 
case and to do so, moreover, with reasonable dispatch is primary. 
One’s political preferences will do the trick some of the time, as the 
attitudinalist school has demonstrated, but not always, because 
they are bound to be tempered by other concerns. These include 
the feasibility of a particular judicial intervention given the limited 
knowledge and powers of courts, the effect on the law’s stability 
and the court’s reputation if its attitude toward precedent and 
statutory text is seen as too cavalier, and the judge’s desire for 
ideological consistency (which is different from, though often 
correlated with, political preference).51  
 
Eva S. Nilsen is an Associate Clinical Professor at Boston University 
School of Law.  She authored a special issue of the Boston University Law 
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Review based on a symposium on "The Role of the Judge in the Twenty-First 
Century”.  The symposium was held on April 21st and 22nd, 2006 at the Boston 
University School of Law.  At the symposium a distinguished group of federal 
judges and academics exchanged ideas about judges and what society expects 
from them.   
The following are selected excerpts from her article. Nilsen states that 
Professor Erwin Chemerinsky rejects the Formalism approach: “Judges decide 
cases based on their politics and other values, and that this is just as true of 
conservative judges as liberal ones denies that there is any such thing as 
discretion-free judging. In his view, judges make law constantly, and in doing so 
they draw on their judgment, which is based on their ideology and 
experiences”52.  
Professor Ward Farnsworth also rejects the Formalism approach: “Once a 
case is close enough to create dissent, the source of law involved tends to 
diminish in importance; the decision ends up being made on the basis of policy 
judgments that cut across the divide between constitutional and non-
constitutional sources of law.”53  
First Circuit Chief Judge Michael Boudin agrees with the other panelists 
that the work of judges today is no longer simply resolving criminal and civil 
disputes: “Judges are indeed lawmakers”54. Boudin had concerns about judges 
overstepping their role. “This role can only remain beneficial and secure if it is 
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employed with due regard for the legislature. When courts act as reformers and 
effect dramatic innovation, they set themselves up against the democratic 
process and invite a backlash”55.  
Professor Judith Resnik also sees the role of the judge changing over 
time. “There has been a dramatic shift over the past thirty years, as cases once 
decided in courtrooms before Article III judges are now decided by administrative 
agencies and private providers. This has been facilitated by Congress, with its 
willingness to delegate much of the Article III power to non-Article III judges”56. 
Associate Clinical Professor Nilsen discussed larger caseloads, more 
complex cases, and the increasingly specialized nature of litigation as affecting 
the role of the judge: 
Some commentators argue that complex cases absorb 
inordinate judicial resources, drawing some judges away from more 
routine cases and increasing the burden on others. Unless we 
increase their numbers, judges may not be able to devote enough 
time to cases, thereby risking erroneous decisions. Specialized 
courts are invoked by many as a potential solution to the problem 
that increasingly specialized knowledge is required to decide 
complex cases.57 
 
Professor David Faigman, also sees the role of the judge as changing. 
“Judges today are required to adjudicate issues turning on complex questions of 
economics, statistics, science, social science, and mathematics. Scientific and 
technological advances and the increasing use of expert witnesses tax the 








generalist judge”58.  He calls on judges to learn science: "Scientifically illiterate 
judges pose a grave threat to the judiciary's power and legitimacy."59 
Professor Jeffrey Rachlinski, discussed research that found bankruptcy 
judges outcomes depending on their political orientation. He suggests that this 
finding may counsel against over-reliance on specialized courts. The more 
specialized courts we have, Rachlinski warns, the more politicized our courts 
could be.60 
Professor Geoffrey Stone looks at the courts previous mistakes to make a 
point on present day judges: “The decision to uphold bans on anti-government 
speech in World War I, the Japanese American internment in World War II, and 
the numerous anti-Communist laws during the Cold War. Eventually, all three 
became cause for profound regret; these cases have come to be regarded as 
constitutional failures and as black marks on the Court's reputation”61. Stone is 
optimistic that the Court has learned from the mistakes of the past, the Nixon-era 
Pentagon Papers case, the enemies-list wiretapping case, and the recent cases 
involving prisoners of war at Guantanamo. These cases, in Stone's view, 
“discarded the “logical” presumption favoring the government's national security 
measures in exchange for a "pragmatic" presumption of close judicial scrutiny of 
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government's national security measures in exchange for a "pragmatic" 
presumption of close judicial scrutiny.”62 
 First Circuit Judge Juan Torruella addressed the future role of judges.  He 
sees large-scale immigration exerting great strains on court resources. 
“Caseloads will become dominated by immigration and civil rights issues.”63 
ISRAEL’S APPOINTMENT OF JUDGES 
 In this section I will describe how someone becomes a judge in Israel.  
The reader will find that Israel appoints their judges.  For now, I will address how 
a nine member committee representing Israel’s three branches of government 
plus the legal profession chooses who will serve as a judge in Israel.  I will 
address the faults of this way of selecting judges later in my discussion. 
 Eli M. Salzberger (Professor of Law at the University of Haifa Faculty of 
Law in Israel) wrote on how Israelis become judges. His work is entitled, Judicial 
Appointments and Promotions in Israel - Constitution, Law and Politics (also 
referenced in The Role of the Judge in Israel).   
First and foremost, and in spite of a committee choosing Israel’s judges, 
Israel is a democracy. “It is said that out of the very many new states established 
after the Second World War, only very few have managed to establish and 
maintain a real democracy, a liberal democracy. Israel is one of them.”64 Israel’s 
judiciary is credited for Israel’s success as a democracy, “the Supreme Court of 
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Israel, together with other legal institutions, such as the Attorney General and the 
prosecution agencies, managed to construct important features of Israel’s 
democracy and protect others.”65  Israel’s judges are held in high regard by their 
international peers: “The quality of the Israeli judiciary and especially its Supreme 
Court was acknowledged recently by Lord Wolf, the Lord Chief Justice of 
England and Wales, who declared that the Israeli Supreme Court is one of the 
best courts he is aware of world wide.66       
 Israel has relied on appointment of its judges almost since its inception. 
“The basic framework of judicial selection for the general courts system in Israel 
has been in practice for more than 50 years now. It’s most important component 
is the judicial appointments and promotions statutory committee.”67 
 All three of Israel’s branches of government along with non-government 
lawyers serve on the selection committee: 
 “The nine members committee represents the three branches of 
government plus the legal profession. Politicians - two parliament 
members elected by the Knesset, traditionally one from the 
opposition, and two government ministers one of whom is the 
Minister of Justice, the chair of the committee - have an important 
input, but the majority of members are professionals - two Bar 
members, elected by the Council of the Bar for three years, and 
three Supreme Court justices, the President of the Court and two 
judges elected by all the Court’s members for a period of three 
years. The Supreme Court judges are the biggest block.”68 
 
 Candidates must be nominated. “Nominations for the committee’s 
consideration can be made by the Minister of Justice, The President of the 
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Supreme Court and any three members of the committee. In practice, this 
requirement means that in most cases the Nominees are agreed upon by the 
Minister and the President of the Court.”69 
 One must be a lawyer or a legal academic with minimum experience to be 
considered for the position of judge, “candidates for judicial positions can be 
practicing lawyers or legal academics with a minimum period of experience (five 
years to the peace court, seven years to the district court and ten years to the 
Supreme Court) prior to the nomination.”70 
 Candidates come from a varied background and tend to serve as 
prosecutors before serving as a lower court judge.  Judges then tend to work 
their way up from lower court to higher court: 
 “The law also allows a ‘significant jurist’ to be a nominee to the 
Supreme Court, provided that he or she gains the support of three 
quarters of the selection committee members. In practice, most 
peace courts’ judges are selected from among private and public 
practitioners (mainly prosecutors). Most district court judges are 
either peace court judges who gain promotion, or senior 
prosecutors and other state legal office holders who are nominated 
directly to the district court. The Supreme Court judges are either 
district court judges who gain promotion, or very senior state legal 
officers, such as the Attorney General or State Attorney, or, 
occasionally, senior academics.”71 
 
 The appointment of judges started when the land Israel occupies was 
under British influence. 
 “Appointment of all judges was entrusted to the High 
Commissioner, while the Supreme Court appointees had to be 
approved in London. Judges were to hold office during His 
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Majesty’s pleasure. From the 1930’s, however, the High 
Commissioner formed an informal advisory committee consisting of 
representatives of the Bar and presiding judges, to assist him in 
judicial selection, and from 1943 the members of this committee 
were appointed by the Chief Justice.”72 
 
 The judges consisted of both Jews and Arabs.  
“Jewish and Arab professionals, non-political figures were 
appointed to the peace and district courts (by 1948 nine out of 
twenty district courts judges and thirteen out of forty-one peace 
court judges were Jewish), but the nine-members’ Supreme Court 
was manned mainly by British judges with a representation of one 
Jew and one Arab. For this reason the Supreme Court also gained 
the powers of a high court of justice. All petitions against the 
government or applications for judicial review were under the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.”73 
 
 Once Israel was formed, British influence was replaced with influence from 
Israelis, “however, the government declared that because of the great 
importance of the composition of the Supreme Court, its judges should be 
appointed by the Provisional Council upon nomination by the Minister of Justice. 
In other words, the government delegated to Parliament the competence to 
appoint judges, maintaining its powers to nominate the candidates. This was the 
appointment procedure until the enactment of the Judges Law in 1953.”74 
 Israel’s independence over selecting its judges increased in 1953. 
 “The government initiated the Judges Act already in 1951, but it did 
not pass the third reading until 1953. The law increased the 
structural independence of the judiciary by holding that judges 
would have tenure until the mandatory retirement age of 70, and 
that their wages could not be decreased separately. But the most 
significant component of this law was a new procedure for the 
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appointment and promotion of judges. In an interesting move the 
government and the Knesset gave up their powers to appoint 
judges and the law established a committee to perform this task, 
while giving the formal appointing power to the President of the 
State.”75 
 
 Professor Saltzberger notes that Israel’s current structure has been in 
place since 1984. “In 1984 the Knesset replaced the Judges Act by Basic Law: 
Judicature, which retained the procedure for the selection of judges, but 
upgraded its normative status to a basic law, to be part of Israel’s Constitution. In 
addition, small changes in the wording of the article strengthened the status of 
the selection committee as the final decision making body regarding the 
appointment and promotion of judges and reinforcing the fact that the role of the 
President of the state is purely a formal one.”76 
BASICS OF A JUDGE IN ISRAEL 
 In this section I will offer facts about judges in Israel.  Nothing in this 
section is in dispute, and the information is offered simply to give the reader a 
better understanding of Israeli judges. 
According to Basic Law: 71 The Judicature. Courts Law [Consolidated 
Version], 5744-1984, Sections 1-24, the following are facts about an Israeli 
judge: 
Appointments 
 Judges are appointed by the President of the State upon the 
nomination of “the Judges’ Nominations Committee”. The 
Nominations Committee is composed of nine members: three 
judges (the President of the Supreme Court, and two Supreme 
Court justices), two Ministers (one of them being the Minister of 
                                                           






Justice), two members of the Knesset and two representatives of 
the Israel Bar Association. At the head of the Committee is the 
Minister of Justice.   
The three organs of the State - the legislative, executive, and 
judicial branch, as well as the Bar Association are represented in 
the Judges’ Nominations Committee. Thus, the shaping of the 
judicial body, through the manner of judicial appointment, is carried 
out by all the authorities together.     
Operation of Judges’ Nominations Committee 
 The manner of nominating judges in Israel and the 
composition of the Nominations Committee ensure that the 
considerations taken into account in the nomination of a judge are 
relevant and material: the nominee’s legal stature, his experience, 
his capability and integrity.   
 Notice as to the requirement of a judicial appointment is 
published in Reshumot (the official government gazette).  An 
attorney who wishes to be appointed a judge submits to the 
Judges’ Nominations Committee a request on the questionnaire 
that the Committee prescribes. The candidate appears before a 
sub-committee of the Nominations Committee, which presents its 
findings to the Nominations Committee. In addition, the following 
may propose candidates: the Minister of Justice, the President of 
the Supreme Court, and the three Committee members. The 
Committee decides on the appointment of a judge by majority vote 
of members taking part in the ballot.   
Qualifications 
 The following are qualified to be appointed a justice of the 
Supreme Court of Israel: a person who has held office as a judge of 
a District Court for a period of five years, or a person who is 
inscribed, or entitled to be inscribed, in the roll of advocates, and 
has for not less than ten years –continuously or intermittently- (of 
which five years at least in Israel) been engaged in the profession 
of an advocate, served in a judicial capacity or other legal function 
in the service of the State of Israel or other service as designated in 
regulations in this regard, or has taught law at a university or a 
higher school of learning as designated in regulations in this regard. 
To the Supreme Court can also be appointed “an eminent jurist”. 
The following are qualified to be appointed a judge of a 
District Court in Israel: a person who has held office as a judge of 
the Magistrates’ Court for a period of four years or a person who is 
inscribed, or entitled to be inscribed, in the roll of advocates, and 
has for not less than seven years –continuously or intermittently- (of 
which three years at least in Israel) been engaged in the profession 





or has taught law at a university or a higher school of learning as 
designated in regulations in this regard.  
The following are qualified to be appointed a judge of the 
Magistrates’ Court: a person who is inscribed, or entitled to be 
inscribed, in the roll of advocates, and has for not less than five 
years -continuously or intermittently- (of which two years at least in 
Israel) been engaged in the profession of an advocate, served in a 
judicial capacity or other legal function, or has taught law at a 
university or a higher school of learning as designated in 
regulations in this regard.   
Citizenship 
 A person may not be appointed as a judge if he is not a 
citizen of Israel.    
Declaration of Allegiance 
 Prior to the commencement of his term of office the judge 
declares before the President of the State his “allegiance to the 
State of Israel and its laws; to dispense true justice, not to pervert 
the law nor to show favor”.   
                                    Salary 
 The salary of the judges and other sums paid to them during 
their tenure or subsequently, or to their beneficiaries after their 
death, are determined by law or by resolution of the Knesset, or 
one of its committees. The law does not permit a resolution 
specifically intended to lower the salary of judges.  
Exclusivity of Office 
 A judge may not be engaged in a further occupation or take 
up a public function, except as prescribed by law, or with the 
consent of the President of the Supreme Court and the Minister of 
Justice.    
Term of Office: Commencement and Conclusion 
 The term of office of a judge commences with his declaration 
of allegiance. It does not terminate other than at one of the periods 
determined by law. These are: on retirement at pension - the age of 
retirement is 70, and a judge cannot serve past this age, 
resignation, death, by his election or appointment to a position 
whose bearers are proscribed from being Knesset candidates. The 
term of office of a judge also terminates with his removal from office 
- whether by resolution of the Judges’ Nominations Committee 
passed by a majority of at least seven members, or by decision of 
the Judges’ Disciplinary Tribunal. A judge may be required to retire 
on pension before reaching retirement age, if the Nominations 
Committee, on the basis of a medical opinion, establishes that by 
reason of the state of his health he is unable to continue carrying 






 Judges are subject to the Judges’ Disciplinary Tribunal. The 
Presiding Judge of the Disciplinary Tribunal is appointed by the 
President of the Supreme Court. All the members of the 
Disciplinary Tribunal are judges or retired judges.   
 
Criminal proceedings 
 Judges are subject to criminal proceedings, in the manner 
specified by the law. The initiation of a criminal investigation against 
a judge requires the consent of the Attorney General. A statement 
of indictment against a judge can only be filed by the Attorney 
General. A criminal trial against a judge can only be held before a 
District Court, sitting with a bench of three judges, unless the 
defendant judge agrees that the case be heard in the regular 
fashion. 
Further Advanced Study for Judges 
 In Israel judicial training per se is not a precondition to 
judicial appointment. The Israeli judge is an experienced jurist who 
is chosen, as stated, from the judiciary, from amongst attorneys, 
the State legal service, or from teachers of law at universities. Yet, 
in order to preserve as well as invigorate the high standard of the 
judiciary, there has been established, under the auspices of the 
Supreme Court in Jerusalem, an Institute of Judicial Training for 
Judges, named after Dr. Yoel Sussmann, a former President of the 
Supreme Court. The advanced studies are intended for serving 
judges, new judges, as well as candidates for the judiciary. At the 
head of the Institute are justices of the Supreme Court. Amongst its 
teachers are judges and lecturers of law faculties in Israel, as well 
as guest lecturers from abroad.77 
 
ELECTION OF JUDGES IN THE UNITED STATES 
 In this section I will describe how a lawyer becomes a judge in the United 
States.  I will use Illinois, the State in which I practice law, to illustrate how 
someone becomes a judge in the United States.  Illinois is comprised of 102 
Counties and is one of 50 states which make up the United States of America. 
                                                           





 Illinois is a perfect illustration of the process of judicial elections because it 
relies primarily on elections to determine who will serve as a judge.78 Illinois also 
has a few appointed judges79  and has a history of corruption in its judicial 
branch80.  
                                                           
78 “There are two kinds of judges in the circuit court: circuit judges and associate 
judges. Associate judges are appointed by circuit judges, pursuant to Supreme 
Court rules, for four-year terms. An associate judge can hear any case, except 
criminal cases punishable by a prison term of one year or more (felonies). An 
associate judge can be specially authorized by the Supreme Court to hear all 
criminal cases. Circuit judges in a circuit elect one of their members to serve as 
chief circuit court judge.” State of Illinois, Welcome to Illinois Courts. Illinois 
Circuit Court General Information.   
79 The following is information on applying for an appointed position as a judge in 
Illinois.  “Appointment to the bench. The application. If you're seeking an 
appointment as an associate judge in any circuit, you'll have to fill out a written 
application form, obtainable from the Illinois Supreme Court (see sidebar). The 
comprehensive 16-page application, available from the Administrative Office of 
the Illinois Courts, requires candidates to disclose such matters as whether 
they've ever received treatment or counseling for alcohol or substance abuse; 
any mental or physical disabilities that might prevent them from carrying out 
judicial duties; all continuing legal education attended within the last five years; 
full citations to all published articles on legal matters; their own and their 
spouse's business interests; whether they've ever been personally involved in 
any litigation, disciplinary, or criminal matters; whether their professional 
conduct or ability has ever been criticized in a written opinion by a judge or 
tribunal, or the subject of a complaint before any disciplinary authority; whether 
their law licenses or right to practice law have ever been denied, revoked, or 
suspended; the names of judges and adversaries with knowledge of their 
character and abilities, including the cases which they and the candidates 
handled; and any community service they've performed” Illinois Bar journal 
Volume 98 • Number 9 • Page 456. 
80It was called OPERATION GREYLORD, named after the curly wigs worn by 
British judges. And in the end—through undercover operations that used 
honest and very courageous judges and lawyers posing as crooked ones... and 
with the strong assistance of the Cook County court and local police—92 
officials had been indicted, including 17 judges, 48 lawyers, eight policemen, 10 
deputy sheriffs, eight court officials, and one state legislator. Nearly all were 
convicted, most of them pleading guilty (just a few are shown in our photo). It 





In this section, I will describe in the Problems with Elected Judges Section 
below, many believe that the reason we have corruption in the judiciary is due to 
the fact that judges rely on elections to acquire the position.  The reader will find 
that those wishing to serve as judges must go through an election process. 
 The specific language setting forth the way these judges come into power 
is found in the Constitution of the State of Illinois, Article VI The Judiciary Section 
7. Judicial Circuits Section 12. Election and Retention: 
(a)  Supreme, Appellate and Circuit Judges shall be nominated at 
primary elections or by petition. Judges shall be elected at general 
or judicial elections as the General Assembly shall provide by law. 
A person eligible for the office of Judge may cause his name to 
appear on the ballot as a candidate for Judge at the primary and at 
the general or judicial elections by submitting petitions. The 
General Assembly shall prescribe by law the requirements for 
petitions. 
(b)  The office of a Judge shall be vacant upon his death, 
resignation, retirement, removal81 or upon the conclusion of his 
term without retention in office. Whenever an additional Appellate 
or Circuit Judge is authorized by law, the office shall be filled in the 
manner provided for filling a vacancy in that office. 
(c)  A vacancy occurring in the office of Supreme, Appellate or 
Circuit Judge shall be filled as the General Assembly may provide 
by law. In the absence of a law, vacancies may be filled by 
appointment by the Supreme Court. A person appointed to fill a 
vacancy 60 or more days prior to the next primary election to 
nominate Judges shall serve until the vacancy is filled for a term at 
                                                                                                                                                                             
County. The federal Bureau of Investigation Investigations of Public Corruption, 
03/15/04. 
81 An example of why a judge would be removed from the bench is because of the 
judges’ mental health “While expressing sympathy for Brim's mental health 
issues, the Illinois Courts Commission said "the only appropriate remedy" was 
to remove her from office because of her 18-year history of mental breakdowns 
and repeated failures to follow through with proper medical treatment. The 
decision was effective immediately.”  Chicago Tribune, Cook County judge 





the next general or judicial election. A person appointed to fill a 
vacancy less than 60 days prior to the next primary election to 
nominate Judges shall serve until the vacancy is filled at the 
second general or judicial election following such appointment. 
(d)  Not less than six months before the general election preceding 
the expiration of his term of office, a Supreme, Appellate or Circuit 
Judge who has been elected to that office may file in the office of 
the Secretary of State a declaration of candidacy to succeed 
himself. The Secretary of State, not less than 63 days before the 
election, shall certify the Judge's candidacy to the proper election 
officials. The names of Judges seeking retention shall be submitted 
to the electors, separately and without party designation, on the 
sole question whether each Judge shall be retained in office for 
another term. The retention elections shall be conducted at general 
elections in the appropriate Judicial District, for Supreme and 
Appellate Judges, and in the circuit for Circuit Judges. The 
affirmative vote of three-fifths of the electors voting on the question 
shall elect the Judge to the office for a term commencing on the 
first Monday in December following his election.  
 
BASICS OF A JUDGE IN THE UNITED STATES 
In this section I will offer facts about judges in the United States.  I will 
describe Cook County judges.  Cook County is the most populous County in 
Illinois82. Nothing in this section is in dispute and the information is offered to give 
the reader a better understanding of the environment of a typical United States 
judge. 
The Circuit Court of Cook County of the State of Illinois is the largest of 
the 24 judicial circuits in Illinois and one of the largest unified court systems in the 
world. It has more than 400 judges who serve the 5.1 million residents of Cook 
                                                           
82 According to US Census Bureau, Cook County’s population was 5,240,700 in 





County within the City of Chicago and its 126 surrounding suburbs. More than 
1.2 million cases are filed each year. 
 The Circuit Court of Cook County was created by a 1964 amendment to 
the Illinois Constitution which reorganized the courts in Illinois.  The amendment 
effectively merged the often confusing and overlapping jurisdictions of Cook 
County’s previous 161 courts into one uniform and cohesive court of general 
jurisdiction. 
Today, the Circuit Court of Cook County is a unified court system in which 
all trial courts are consolidated under the chief judge, Honorable Timothy C. 
Evans, who has centralized authority to coordinate and supervise the 
administrative functions of the court.  
 Chief Judge Evans is responsible for the assignment of approximately 400 
judges throughout the court's ten divisions and six geographic districts and the 
appointment of a presiding judge to head each division and district.  The Chief 
Judge also oversees the court’s Surety Section and the Juvenile Justice and 
Child Protection Resource Section, appointing a judge to head each of those 
sections as well. 
The Office of the Chief Judge is the administrative arm of the court.  It 
prepares the court's annual budget and supervises more than 2,000 non-judicial 
employees who work in 13 offices that provide probation and other court-support 
services, including court reporting and foreign language interpreting. Copyright 





 For administrative and management purposes, the court has divided Cook 
County into six geographic sub-districts.  This allows the court to better serve the 
county’s large population.  To accommodate its vast caseload, the court is 
organized into three functional departments: County, Municipal and Juvenile 
Justice and Child Protection.83  
FAULTS WITH APPOINTING JUDGES IN ISRAEL 
In this section I will review the negative aspects regarding appointing 
judges in Israel. As we saw in the How to Become a Judge in Israel Section, 
Israel goes to great pains to find the best candidates to serve as judges.  What 
we find in this Section is that even with the best intentions, politics permeates in 
the appointment of judges in Israel.  
Critiques of the how Israelis select their judges argue that it results in a 
majority of judges with a particular political ideation. A recurring complaint is that 
the appointment committee selects judges with a left- leaning ideology.  On 
October 20, 2013, The Times of Israel printed an article by Lazar Berman.  In the 
article he described such contention amongst Israelis:  
 “I think we have a distorted system that no other country in 
the world has, in which the judges themselves participate in their 
own selection. Coalition chief MK Yariv Levin, who is leading the 
effort to get the bills passed, told Israel Radio on Sunday, ‘It is done 
in a system of cronyism….I think there is no place for this. The 
change is positive because a foundation of democracy is that no 
                                                           





branch should be able to choose itself, so it cannot be that judges 
will control the system of selecting themselves”84. 
 
Levin argued that the court was controlled by a far-left faction that 
imposes its agenda on the Israeli public.  He addressed calls for changes in the 
make-up of the committee that selects judges. These measures, he said, are 
being pushed in order “to end the court’s intervention, in which it relies on its own 
judgment in place of the legislative and executive branch in matters that have to 
do with one’s worldview. The same minority that controls the judiciary tries to use 
its strength in order to impose its values on the entire society.”85  
He described the court as “sometimes even radical,” accused them of 
regularly siding with non-Israelis over Israelis on the basis of the litigants’ 
identities.86 
Berman’s article offers suggested remedies. “The Knesset 
would elect the Supreme Court president for a five-year term, 
changing the make-up of the selection committee by replacing two 
justices with a retired District Court judge who would be chosen by 
the heads of the District Courts, and an academic chosen by the 
prime minister and making it easier for the Knesset to reenact 
legislation that the Supreme Court struck down under the Human 
Dignity and Liberty and Freedom of Occupation Basic Laws. The 
bill would allow a simple Knesset majority of 61 votes to attempt to 
repass legislation within four years of the Supreme Court decision. 
The Knesset currently needs at least 80 members to circumvent the 
court.”87 
 
The Jerusalem Post ran a story by Gil Hoffman and Jeremy Sharon 
06/03/2013.  The article touched on the concern about the political make-up of 
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the Judicial Selection Committee.  The concern is that is Committee is left-
leaning (dovish): “Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s coalition failed to elect a 
representative to the committee that selects Supreme Court justices, in a 
dramatic secret ballot vote Monday in the Knesset. The MKs normally select one 
MK from the coalition and one from the opposition to the two slots on the 
selection committee that are reserved for MKs. But the Knesset voted for MKs 
Isaac Herzog (Labor) and Yitzhak Cohen (Shas) over the coalition’s candidate, 
Yisrael Beytenu MK David Rotem.  Cohen is Shas’s most leftwing MK. He 
recently wrote to Netanyahu urging him to adopt the Arab League’s diplomatic 
initiative. The vote means that the judges to be selected to replace retiring 
justices Asher Grunis and Edna Arbel on the Supreme Court will likely be very 
dovish.”88  
Zalman Ahnsaf’s article in the June 4, 2013 edition of Hamidoa also 
reports on the friction that politics causes in determining who serve on the judicial 
selection committee. The concern is over left-leaning members of the judicial 
selection committee.  
Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s coalition suffered an embarrassing 
reversal as it failed to place a representative on the committee that selects High 
Court justices, in a secret ballot late Monday in the Knesset, the Jerusalem Post 
reported. 
The ruling parties usually get one member on the committee, along with 
one from the opposition. But in this case, Likud-Beiteinu didn’t rule, as MKs Isaac 
                                                           





Herzog (Labor) and Yitzchak Cohen (Shas) won out over the coalition’s 
candidate, Yisrael Beiteinu MK David Rotem. 
The vote reflected tensions between Netanyahu and former Knesset 
Speaker Reuven Rivlin, who lost his post when the former threw his support to 
Yisrael Beitienu’s Yuri Edelstein, the new speaker. 
Rivlin actively campaigned to defeat Rotem, which was seen as an act of 
revenge, the Post said. 
Cohen is considered to be Shas’s most leftwing MK. He recently wrote to 
Netanyahu urging him to respond favorably to the Arab League’s diplomatic 
initiative. His participation on the selection committee means that the judges to 
be selected to replace retiring justices Asher Grunis and Edna Arbel on the Court 
will likely be dovish inclined.89 
There is also concern that those who serve on the judicial selection 
committee hold an ideology that is right-leaning.  On December 11, 2012, 
Mondoweiss published an article by Annie Robbins.  In the article Robbins 
discusses a Supreme Court ruling that allowed the destruction of a mosque.  She 
also addressed the belief that those who appoint Israeli judges hold an ideology 
that is considered to be extreme right leaning: 
On its face, the demolition was nothing extraordinary and 
what we’ve come to expect. But the destruction of this little mosque 
in the village of Al Mufaqara provides yet another example of how 
Regavim, a rising, extreme-national-religious social movement 
whose goal is to encourage the state to demolish Palestinian 
homes and public buildings, works in symmetry with Israel’s 
                                                           





recently radicalized Supreme Court to escalate efforts to remove 
Palestine from the map. This is about a new political constellation: 
Regavim, the Supreme Court, and the Knesset are working 
together to circumvent the law and cleanse the land. In the past 
though, the court acted to facilitate the land grab. It was still an 
instrument of legal recourse, and at times worked in Palestinians’ 
favor. But recent changes by the Knesset’s judicial selection 
committee are apparently being used to make the court a more 
activist component of the push to clear Palestinians from Area C 
[Robbins, 2012].  
 
This push to the extreme right involves coordination of Knesset legislation, 
the radical fanatic group Regavim, and the Supreme Court all in one fell swoop. 
Michael Sfard reminds us Israeli legislation does not apply to the West Bank 
because the Knesset does not exercise jurisdiction over the West Bank. That is 
left to the courts, which Ratner rightly describes an entering a “radical-fanatical 
right-wing phase.” 
Robbins also voiced concerns over the results of extreme right leaning 
judges, “I have serious doubts about the learning curve of a Chief Justice who 
sides with the powerful and, according to a former Supreme Court justice, has 
long supported reducing the powers of the high court. Though reducing the 
Supreme Court’s powers may well be on hold now, given Grunis’s importance to 
the rightwing agenda.”90 
There is criticism that the appointment of judges does not result in the best 
candidates becoming judges. On July 11, 2013, The Jerusalem Post published 
an article by Yonah Jeremy Bob.  The article addressed the concern that politics 
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in the selection committed resulted in judges committing crimes: “Justice Minister 
Tzipi Livni on Wednesday evening took the unprecedented step of inviting the 
press to the opening of the first meeting of the Judicial Appointments Committee 
under her leadership.” There was significant public controversy surrounding the 
committee toward the end of the term of Livni's predecessor, Yaakov Neeman. 
There were incidents in which judges were accused of having committed criminal 
or civil crimes. Supreme Court President Asher D. Grunis was even quoted as 
saying that some of the judges were "ticking time bombs" being kept on the 
bench so as not to harm their retirement benefits.  
 Livni has campaigned to make the committee more transparent. 
However, as she has met with significant resistance, this time she settled for a 
press conference right outside the room where the committee was about to meet.  
“Choosing judges is not merely a question of professional quality, but also of 
judges who are humane and show social concern," she told reporters. 
She noted that the courts "embody the democracy of the State of Israel 
and its values," adding, "I believe that politics will remain outside this room 
[where the meeting was to occur], and that our work will be properly focused" to 
best serve Israel's citizens.”91 
Mary L. Clark is a Professor of Law, Interim Dean of Academic Affairs and 
Senior Vice Provost of American University.  She wrote an article that addressed 
concerns held by the legal community regarding whether judges should serve on 
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commissions that select judges.  The article is titled “Judges Judging Judicial 
Candidates: Should Currently Serving Judges Participate in Commissions to 
Screen and Recommend Article III Candidates Below the Supreme Court Level?”  
In the article, Professor Clark discusses ‘judges deciding who serves as 
judges’ as a threat to judicial integrity and impartiality:  
The undue accretion of power by judges involved in judges’ 
screening commission service raises related concerns for judicial 
integrity and impartiality. Potential threats to judicial integrity and 
impartiality include: (a) undermining of elevation candidates’ 
decisional autonomy; (b) judges’ undue involvement in the overtly 
political (indeed overtly partisan) activity of judicial appointments; 
and (c) judges’ engagement in ideological and/or other strategic 
behavior as commission members.92 
 
According to Professor Clark, concern of the impact on decisional 
autonomy of elevation stems from a potential lack of objectivity. 
Candidates Including judges on judicial screening commissions 
raises questions for potential impacts on the decisional autonomy, 
or individual independence, of currently serving judges who are 
interested in elevation and whose candidacies would be reviewed 
by judicial colleagues on the commission. At bottom, the question is 
whether judges interested in elevation could be affected by, 
including being motivated to curry favor with, judges known, or 
anticipated, to be serving on judicial screening commissions. This 
dynamic has the potential to influence elevation aspirants’ judicial 
conduct, including case reasoning and/or judicial outcomes. 93  
 
Professor Clark addressed those who do not share her concern about 
judicial integrity. She stated their argument: “The typical judge’s chance of 
promotion is so low that it is unlikely that desire for promotion affects the 
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decisions of more than a handful of judge.”94 Professor Clark counters this 
argument by citing literature on European civil law: “Still, concern for sitting 
judges currying favor with other judges for promotion purposes has long been 
expressed in the literature on European civil law judiciaries, where senior judges 
evaluate the promotion merits of more junior judges. As Peter Russell observes 
there is danger to the independence of judges:  
“[J]udicial independence may be threatened . . . by senior 
judges [i.e., those higher on the judicial hierarchy] using 
administrative and personnel controls to direct the decision making 
of individual judges lower in the judicial hierarchy.” [T]he danger 
point for judicial independence may be more in the process of 
promotion and career advancement than initial appointment.” He 
warns, “[I]f those who control career advancement within the 
judiciary are perceived to reward or punish a particular ideological 
orientation in judicial decision making, judicial independence can be 
seriously compromised.”95 
 
Professor Clark asserts the politics in the selection committee is no 
different than politics in elections for judges: 
Concern that politics will emanate from judges’ involvement 
in judicial appointments; critics of the use of judicial screening 
commissions decry the political nature of these bodies, asserting 
that they are no less political than the elective system; the politics 
have simply gone underground. While the ABA’s and other 
proposals seek to ameliorate the partisanship infecting judicial 
appointments by employing a self-consciously bipartisan model, 
their proposals do not eliminate the partisanship. After all, ‘bi-
partisan rarely means nonpartisan.’ No doubt, political 
considerations—indeed, partisan considerations—will continue to 
influence judicial candidate deliberations.96 
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Professor Clark also argued that even good intentions can be influenced 
by subconscious bias.  Her concern is that judges may subconsciously or 
consciously favor judges who share their ideology.  
Related to this last concern for judges’ undue political and/or 
partisan involvement in judicial appointments is concern for judges’ 
potentially ideological and/or other strategic behavior in evaluating 
judicial candidates while serving on judicial screening commissions, 
whether consciously done or not. Might it be natural for judges 
serving on a screening commission to more highly evaluate 
prospective colleagues with whom they share judicial philosophies, 
again whether conscious or not? Concern for this potential could be 
addressed in part by a rule prohibiting judges from participating in 
the screening of candidates for judgeships within their own circuit. 
Even so, there would remain a larger concern for ideological 
evaluation of Article III candidates, with implications for the 
judiciary’s overall composition. Closely related to the potential for 
judges’ ideological evaluation of judicial candidates is the question 
of to what extent judges serving on Article III commissions might 
act strategically, or otherwise indirectly, in order to further the 
selection of judges sympathetic to their particular judicial 
philosophies. This could be a factor, for example writing samples.97 
 
    FAULTS WITH ELECTING JUDGES IN THE UNITED STATES 
In this section I will describe the faults with electing judges in the United 
States. As we saw earlier in this thesis, both Israel and the United States pride 
themselves on being democracies.  The reader will find that the problem with 
judicial elections is the expense of running for office.  The need for money leads 
to undue influences on the candidates.  Judicial candidates are no different from 
other candidates. Another concern is that the nature of politics also affects who is 
elected as a judge.  Political leaders reward those who help to make them 
powerful, as opposed to rewarding a candidate with the best qualifications.  
                                                           





Pamela S. Karlan is a Professor of Law at Stanford Law School.98 She 
wrote an article that addressed influences on judges who rely on elections, 
“Electing Judges, Judging Elections, and the Lessons of Caperton.”   
Professor Karlan agreed that judges facing elections can be influenced by 
outside forces.  
Money can play a critical role in judicial elections. Especially 
because many judicial elections are low-salience, down-ballot 
races, political spending often serves as the major source of 
information to voters. Just as judicial candidates may face a 
temptation to shade their decisions to attract voters support, so too 
they may face the temptation to shade their decisions to attract the 
financial support that enables them to appeal to voters.99 100 
 
Professor Karlan discussed the Supreme Court’s recognition that judges 
must be impartial: “Every member of the Court recognized that the Due Process 
Clause requires that judges be impartial.101 She also discussed the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s recognition of the likelihood that judicial candidates will be 
influenced by their reliance on voters. She looked at the ruling in Chisom v. 
Roemer102. The Court recognized the difficulty of “crediting judges with total 
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99 82 Harvard Law Review [Vol. 123:80 At 90]. 
100 See James L. Gibson, Challenges to the Impartiality of State Supreme Courts: 
Legitimacy Theory and “New-Style” Judicial Campaigns, 102 AM. POL. SCI. 
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Karlan, Two Concepts of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 535, 541 
(1999). 
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indifference to the popular will while simultaneously requiring them to run for 
elected office.”103 
Karlan observes that the Court also recognized the likelihood that judges 
will be influenced by their reliance on voters to remain in office: ‘If judges are 
subject to regular elections they are likely to feel that they have at least some 
personal stake in the outcome of every publicized case. Elected judges cannot 
help being aware that if the public is not satisfied with the outcome of a particular 
case, it could hurt their reelection prospects.’ ”104 
On May 22, 1988, The New York Times published an article by Mary 
Connelly. The article was written in response to calls by bar associations and 
others, that New York change from electing judges to a system of appointment 
known as merit selection.  In the article, Mary Connelly gave former Secretary of 
State Cyrus R. Vance, a past president of the Association of the Bar of the City of 
New York and chairman of a lobbying group called the Committee for Modern 
Courts, an opportunity to express his reason for a system of appointment known 
as merit selection for judges.   He stated that judicial elections do not result in the 
best candidate being elected: “The major problem with electing judges is that 
New York doesn't really have ‘'elections.’' Justices of the State Supreme Court, 
our principal trial court, are not selected by the voters in primary elections, but 
are handpicked by unelected party bosses and nominated at something called a 
judicial convention. When the nominating process is over, the election is, too. In 
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most parts of New York one party is so dominant that its candidates are all but 
guaranteed election. Thus the party bosses not only select their party's 
candidate, but in effect ‘'appoint’' the judges.”105 
Vance stated that certain candidates are guaranteed victory based on 
being backed by certain political leaders. “Candidates picked by the Democratic 
Party bosses in New York City - such as Stanley Friedman, former county leader 
of the Bronx, and the late Donald Manes of Queens - are guaranteed victory. In a 
great many places outside of New York City the nomination of the Republican 
Party is tantamount to election.106 
Vance said the result of political bosses determining which candidates win 
judicial elections is bad judges. “All this is an inevitable part of the partisan 
election system. And while the system has given us some outstanding jurists, too 
often judges are selected for their political service rather than their judicial ability. 
Far too often judges chosen by the bosses have been lazy, incompetent or, 
worse, corrupt.”107 108 
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108 Vance suggests appointment as a preferred means of choosing judges. “Since 
1940 there has been a strong movement throughout the United States to 
replace judicial elections with a process that combines the best elements of 
the elective and appointive systems, a process that embodies the American 
Ibideal of respecting ability and effort above political connections. That process 
is called merit selection of judges. Under the merit selection system for the 
New York Court of Appeals, in operation now for 10 years, our Governors 
have selected outstanding jurists upon the nomination of a bipartisan 
nominating commission. Our much admired Chief Judge, Sol Wachtler, who 





PBS’ Frontline produced a program on the issue of selecting judges.  It is 
titled, “How should judges be selected?”  The program offered an unattributed 
quote to sum up the anti-election sentiment: 
‘Putting courts into politics, and compelling judges to 
become politicians, in many jurisdictions has almost destroyed the 
traditional respect for the bench,’ one commentator famously wrote 
on the causes of popular dissatisfaction with the administration of 
justice. And this was back in 1906.109 
 
The program included an interview with John Hill, a lawyer and former 
Chief Justice of the Texas State Supreme Court.  Justice Hill gave his reasons 
for favoring the appointment of judges. He stated that it was the will of the 
people. “I think if it were ever put to the vote of the people of Texas it would pass 
readily, but we've been stopped by politics. We've been stopped by the political 
parties. We've had a lot of political factors that have thwarted our efforts, but we 
have made a lot of progress.”110 
Justice Hill was asked about the source of money that judicial candidates 
must rely on.   “In the meantime you have a system where there's a great deal of 
money that has been spent on judicial elections over the past decade. And that 
money comes from, among others, law firms like your own.” Justice Hill 
described the need for money and where the money comes from. 
 
 Absolutely. We're involved in it. I’m not casting stones at 
others when I'm talking about this problem. It's built into the system 
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that we have. The judges have to have money to run these 
expensive races because the state is so large, we have so many 
television markets. . . That's the system that we're trying to change. 
In the meantime, while we are working for change, we can't turn our 
backs on the judges that we believe should be the judges of choice. 
And we have to support their election. So we do it, and our firm 
does it. Plaintiff's bar does it, the defense bar does it, the business 
community does it. Other interest groups do it, so then you have 
the problem that we're talking about: that the public out there just 
looking and seeing all the money flowing and they say, ‘Well it's 
bound to be having some impact’ So why can't we all get together 
and just take the money out.111 
 
Justice Hill responded to the question “Is justice for sale in the state of 
Texas?” by saying that there is such a perception. “I don't think it is, but there's a 
very widespread perception that there's an element of favoritism, there's an 
element of partisanship, that it matters who your lawyer is, that's out there. To 
what extent I don't know. But if it's out there to the extent that people are 
concerned about coming to Texas or having their legal affairs dealt with in Texas 
then we ought to take that very, very seriously. .. .”112 
Justice Hill again stressed the harmful effect of judges having to rely on 
donations when he was asked whether someone is trying to win some favor with 
the court by donating money to a judicial candidate.  
Once again I'm really hammering on that word. . . The public 
believes that there's some kind of relationship of those 
philosophical results from the contributions being made by the 
supporters that affects specific cases--that has got to be dealt with 
because it's a very bad situation. . . So I'm trying to suggest to you 
that yes, there has been a philosophical change in the court, but I 
don't think that the quid pro quo thing is necessarily true of either 
court. . . I don't think it's true. I think what the problem is that you 







have so much money coming into the system in these partisan 
expensive elections that come primarily from lawyers, that the 
people believe that the lawyers have gained improper control, of 
the courts. And that will never stop. . . So it's a system that has to 
be changed. I sound like a broken record. . ..113 
 
Frontline also referenced Jona Goldschmidt’s article on merit selection of 
judges.  The article is titled “Merit Selection: Current Status, Procedures, and 
Issues”.114 
Goldschmidt offered four reasons for merit selection of judges.  They stem 
from the inherent problems with elections.  She first noted that the public does 
not do its homework before voting. 
There are several arguments raised in favor of merit 
selection. The first addresses the weaknesses of both partisan and 
nonpartisan elective systems. These methods do not allow for 
rational judicial selection: ‘Elections ... are premised on a dubious 
assumption: that the public is attentive and well informed about the 
candidates.’ In fact, it is common knowledge that the public is 
uninformed about judicial candidates, and, worse still, some believe 
that ethnic name recognition is the basis for many voting decisions. 
Election contests are usually issueless and have low voter turnout. 
Most incumbents are easily reelected and often run unopposed.115 
 
Goldschmidt’s second reason for not using elections for choosing judges 
stems from elections not necessarily attracting the best candidates: “Elections 
also discourage many well-qualified people from seeking judicial office. Many 
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attorneys ... have a philosophical distaste for politics and political campaigning, 
and thus refrain from seeking office.116 
Goldschmidt’s third reason for not using elections for choosing judges 
revolves around judges being held to the whim of the electorate, “Elections also 
compromise the independence of the judiciary; judicial officers, unlike other 
elected officials, should not be governed by the transient whims of the public 
which is likely to vote an unpopular, although competent, judge out of office for 
rendering correct but controversial decisions."117 
Goldschmidt’s final reason for not using elections for choosing judges 
comes from the nature of the election process. Her fear is that that electioneering 
takes judges away from judicial duties. “No less significant are the problems 
associated with judges who must campaign and seek campaign contributions 
and with getting court business accomplished during reelection time.” 
Professor Brandice Canes-Wrone of Princeton University and Assistant 
Professor Tom S. Clark of Emory University coauthored an article, “Judicial 
Independence and Nonpartisan Elections” (Wisconsin Law Review), that 
discussed judges and elections.  In the article they concede the existence of a 
conflict between the public’s desire for an independent judiciary and their desire 
for oversight of judicial actions. 
Because independence eliminates a judge’s need to fear politically 
motivated punishments, the property is inherently at variance with judicial 







accountability. Indeed, in contrast to the notion of independence, accountability 
requires the public to have an important role in selecting and monitoring judges.  
This inherent tension between these concepts has not prevented Americans from 
seeking them simultaneously. As Professor James Gibson summarizes, “[T]he 
American people . . . seem to want both independence and accountability from 
their courts.” Americans from seeking them simultaneously. As Professor James 
Gibson summarizes, “[T]he American people . . . seem to want both 
independence and accountability from their courts. at 2009:21 Wisconsin Law 
Review, Judicial Independence 23.118 
Billy Corriher of the Center for American Progress Action Fund wrote an 
article on November 1, 2012, addressing his dissatisfaction with judicial 
elections.  He specifically addressed policies that could help mitigate the 
influence of corporate campaign cash in judicial elections. 
Corriher stressed the need for judges to be free from outside influences: 
“Judges must be independent from political pressure so they can vindicate 
constitutional rights without fear of political backlash. The judiciary is the only 
institution that can remedy violations of the constitution by the other branches of 
government.” (Merit Selection and Retention Elections Keep Judges Out of 
Politics November 1, 2012, at 2.) 
Corriher has concern for the integrity of government in general if judges do 
not objectively rule on issues involving the government.   
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More than any other institution, judges have to keep the 
government true to its constitution. The framers of the U.S. 
Constitution and state constitutions established governments with 
checks and balances. The executive, legislative, and judicial 
branches have distinct roles. In general, the legislatures make the 
laws; the executive branches enforce them; and courts interpret the 
laws, including constitutions. A judiciary free from political 
constraints is crucial to this system of separation of powers. 
Without this independence, judges are just politicians in black 
robes.119 
 
Corriher continued with his concern for the integrity of government if 
judges are subject to outside influences. “If the judiciary becomes another 
political branch responsive to political pressure, then there would be no branch of 
government that could check the power of legislatures or executives when they 
infringe on the constitutional rights of individuals.” 120 
Corriher blames the need to fund elections as a major impediment to 
judicial independence.  
As the amount of money donated to judicial campaigns has 
exploded in recent elections, the influence of campaign cash on the 
judiciary has become a more urgent problem. Candidates in state 
Supreme Court races from 2000 to 2009 raised around $211 
million—two and a half times more than in the previous decade. 
Conflicts of interest have arisen as special interests and parties 
before high courts have spent money to influence elections to those 
courts.121 
 
Corriher cites Sandra Day O’Connor to further make his point about the 
danger judges relying on money. “Retired U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sandra 
Day O’Connor said that, ‘When you enter one of these courtrooms, the last thing 
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you want to worry about is whether the judge is more accountable to a campaign 
contributor or an ideological group than to the law.’ ”122  
Nathan S. Heffernan was a Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court from 
1964-1983 and Chief Justice from 1983-1995.  He wrote an article on the effects 
of elections on judges.  The article was published in the Marquette Law Review. 
Justice Heffernan gave a brief history of judicial elections:  
The theory of popular election of all officers, which came to 
be known as "Jacksonian Democracy," held sway from the late 
1840's until the middle of this century. In fact, by the time of the 
Civil War, twenty four of thirty-four states had adopted an elected 
judiciary. It was not until 1959, with the admission of Alaska, that 
any new state stood against the tide of a fully elected judiciary. 
'Initially all of the new states selected their judges by executive 
appointment shared with the legislature. Gradually, however, with 
the expansion of the frontier, some states adopted the elective 
system. Of the original thirteen states, Georgia was the first to shift 
to an elective system for the selection of lower court judges in 
1812. Indiana, admitted to the Union in 1816, provided in its 
constitution for the election of some of its judges, and in 1832, 
Mississippi decided to elect all of its judges.123 
 
Justice Heffernan agreed that judges relying on money to attain office is 
problematic but offers public that public financing may be a solution. “It is my 
view that the elective system in Wisconsin has worked reasonably well and 
should not be discarded. Rather, contrary to the mandate of Governor Lucey, the 
elective system should be ‘tinkered with’ by instituting a reasonable system of 
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public financing of judicial elections which would hopefully cure the principal ills 
attendant to the election of judges.124 
Thomas R. Phillips is a former Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Texas 
(1988–2004). He spoke at the Twenty‐Seventh Annual National Federalist 
Society Student Symposium, held at the University of Michigan Law School.  His 
presentation addressed whether judges should be appointed or elected.  
Justice Phillips acknowledged the dispute around the issue of electing or 
appointing judges:  
In many states, the debate rages as fiercely as ever over 
whether judges should be ‘appointed’ or ‘elected,’ identified by 
party affiliation or prohibited from any partisan activity, subject to a 
contested race for re‐election or merely an up‐or down ‘retention’ 
referendum, bound by the same ethical and electoral rules as other 
public officials, or treated as wholly distinct from the political 
branches. Even at the federal level, proposals for fixed judicial 
terms are periodically suggested, especially for the Supreme Court, 
and popular election of the federal judiciary has been mooted on 
occasion since Jefferson.125  
 
Justice Phillips describes money as being a major determent to judicial 
elections:  
Today, judicial elections suffer from new, unprecedented 
challenges. The common denominators are campaign money and 
special‐interest agitation, making judicial elections ‘nastier, noisier, 
and costlier’ than ever before. These new, high‐octane campaigns 
threaten judicial independence as surely as mediocre appointments 
in the nineteenth century or anonymous elections in the twentieth 
century ever did. The more partisan, the more frequent, and the 
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more easily contestable the elections are, the more susceptible 
they are to these unfortunate influences.126 
 
Justice Phillips describes the origins of money influencing judicial 
elections: 
 
First, wealthy individuals and groups with economic interests 
in various public policy questions realized that an individual judge 
can have a far greater impact on their fortunes than an individual 
legislator. Although judges face far more constraints in basing their 
official actions on their personal philosophical predilections than do 
legislators, few would insist that personal philosophies never affect 
judicial behavior. Personal injury trial lawyers in Texas were 
probably the first to discover that increased gifts to judicial 
campaigns could make a big difference in electoral outcomes, and 
pay big dividends in more favorable judgments. Business and 
professional groups countered by supporting their own judicial 
candidates, especially after state courts invalidated key tort reform 
laws. These battles were swiftly replicated in other states, 
particularly California and Alabama. By 2000, these local battles 
had essentially been nationalized, with national trial lawyer and 
consumer groups battling business‐oriented groups in multiple 
jurisdictions each election cycle. Increasingly, these groups tried to 
influence the vote through independent expenditures, largely 
eschewing the candidates’ individual campaigns. The 
advertisements purchased by these groups often feature ‘slash and 
burn’ messages crafted to trigger a vote against a candidate or 
slate of candidates, not to enhance support for anyone or anything. 
Such potent phrases and images often overwhelmed the 
candidates’ own messages, which touted boring factoids involving 
qualifications, experience, and community ties. Perversely, many of 
these independent campaigns feature dueling charges over which 
candidate’s record is the most ‘soft on crime,’ even though the 
funders themselves care only about civil jurisprudence.127 
 
Justice Phillips describes the special interest group participation in judicial 
elections:  
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Politically‐oriented social‐issue groups have discovered that 
judicial campaigns can highlight ‘hot‐button’ issues that may excite 
and energize their ‘base’ and enhance turnout for the entire 
election. As in the tort wars, most of these groups rely on 
independent efforts, working outside any candidate’s particular 
campaign organization. Normally, they rely less on paid media than 
on grassroots networking, which can be hard for an outsider even 
to detect, much less to respond to effectively. Chief Justice Randall 
Shepard of Indiana noted that the presence of a gay marriage ban 
on the ballot inadvertently affected Ohio’s judicial elections by 
influencing which voters showed up at the polls. He explained that 
when such issues are at the forefront, ‘judges are not the target at 
all, we’re just road kill . . . for some other venture.’”128 
 
Justice Phillips describes the defects that are especially endemic in 
election of judges.  He offered that contestable election systems undercut the 
stability of the judiciary.  
The concern about partisan sweeps that caused reformers to 
push for non‐partisan elections more than a century ago is an even 
bigger problem today. In Texas, for example, well over one third of 
all opposed judges have been defeated since 1980, generally 
because of straight‐ticket voting. But the extremely low salience of 
non‐partisan judicial election contests make them little better. A 
person with an unusual name probably has a better chance of 
being elected President of the United States than state judge on an 
urban non‐partisan ballot.129 
 
CONCLUSION 
 This thesis described the evolution of the judicial systems present in Israel 
and the United States.  The historical and philosophical basis of the governments 
of Israel and the United States were described. We learned that Jewish people 
had a long stake in the land that became Israel by UN Resolution.  The United 
                                                           






States came into existence through a self-recognition that the inhabitants had 
such a right.    The make-up of the governments was then described.  The 
government of Israel prides itself on being a democracy.  Its three branches of 
government are Legislative, Executive and Judicial.  The United States is also a 
democracy and is also comprised of Legislative, Executive and Judicial 
branches.  We then learned about the role of the judges in each government.  
We examined the views of judges and academics in each country.  The general 
consensus was that judges should resolve disputes while giving as much 
deference to the legislative branch as each case allows. The major difference 
between Israel and the United States was emphasized by my discussion of the 
appointment of judges in Israel and the election of judges in the USA.  Also 
included in that discussion was a statement of facts about the judges.  This 
thesis concluded with a review of the negative aspects of Israel’s appointment 
and the United States elections of judges.   
 Ironically, the solution often offered to the problems associated with the 
appointment of judges was to rely on the election of judges, and the solution to 
the problems associated with electing judges was to rely on the appointment of 
judges.    
 The longstanding quest for a resolution of the issues described in this 
Thesis seems destined for perpetual inaccessibility due to human involvement.  
Human frailty leads to problems with both approaches.  In both approaches, self-





 Those who are afforded an opportunity to appoint just judges often choose 
a candidate who is likely to rule in a way that is consistent with their views, rather 
than a candidate who has merit.  I will t can be argued that people on the 
appointment committed think that their own views are consistent with what is best 
for the whole.  They choose candidates who share their ideology on certain 
issues because they feel that society is best served if their ideology is 
manifested.   This defense is hollow because it ignores academic achievements, 
legal experience and bar association recommendations.   A candidate with 
limited knowledge of laws, inadequate legal experience, and lacking the 
recognition of their peers on bar associations would end up serving as a judge 
over candidates who hold these attributes.  
Those who are afforded an opportunity to ensure just judges through 
elections are often either too lazy or too indifferent to select the best candidate. 
In either case, the result is an ill informed electorate deciding who will serve as 
judge.  This allows judicial candidates to run elections that are not based on their 
merits but  criteria that are easily attainable with big donor-begotten revenue.  Big 
donor revenue enables a candidate to send mailers and flood the electoral 
battleground with signs which create non-merit worthy name recognition.    A 
candidate who sees his opponent’s mailers and signs is forced to counter with 
similar electoral tactics.  These tactics require revenue and this creates the 
cyclical need for big donors.  This Thesis discussed the ill effects of big donors 
on judicial elections.  They include real and perceived (perception is just as 





The ultimate solution currently rests in the laps of the individuals involved 
in both appointments and elections. The solution is not attainable as long they 
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